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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia 
c. R. WERTZ 
vs. 
W. B. CLAY. AND C. S; McNuLTY, TRUSTEE 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
To R. R. PRENTIS, Chief Justice 
H. W. HoLT } 
LoUis S. EPES Justices 
E. W. HuDGINS 
Your petitioner, C. R. Wertz, humbly sets forth: 
If the premises and facts in this case were as 
stated in the opinion of the court, then the conclusions · · 
reached by the court would naturally follow. 
However, as we understand the case, we respect-
fully submit, that the record does not establish the 
facts to be as stated by the court. The record is so 
voluminous, we feel that we have failed to point out to 
the court the exact pages showing that our contention 
as to the facts is correct. · 
We further feel that, under the construction 
placed upon the language of the deed of trust by the 
trustee, not only with reference to the deed of trust 
under investigation, but at all other times; under the 
construction placed upon such language by all other 
trustees in Roanoke City; under the great weight of 
the authorities construing such language, there can be 
but one conclusion reached, and that is, that the sale 
set for July 5th, 1920, was not advertised according to 
the terms of the deed of trust. 
That being true, then under the doctrine of 
Dickinson v. McNulty, there could be no postpone-
ment of the sale to July 16th, 1920, outside of and be-
yo~d the consent of C. R. Wertz either expressly or by 
wa1ver. 
We feel that the record conclusively establishes 
the fact that no one was or will be in any way injured 
by the delay on the part of Wertz in bringing his suit. 
It is true that the land rose in value and was 
doing so from the day of sale to the bringing of the suit; 
there being every incentive on the part of Wertz to act, 
if he had known the facts. 
In addition, if the land did rise in value, there 
having been no valid sale of the land, it was the land of 
Wertz that rose in value and not the land of W. B. Clay. 
Hence, as we understand the opinion of the 
court, the contract of July 3rd, 1920, becomes the 
bridge over which W. B. Clay rides to victory in this 
cause. 
MAIN GROUNDS FOR ASKING REHEARING 
1. Mistakes of facts not disputed and shown 
by simply referring to the record. 
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2. Mistake of facts shown by the evidence of 
appellee and advers~ t~ their.HiJ:el\1t _tp. be exactly oppo-
stte to the court's fmdmg. ~
3. Facts found by this court based on 
McNulty's statements, whose statements as shown by 
this record cannot be considered as evidence standing 
alone. 
4. Facts of "Illegality of contract" fully set up 
in bill and fully proved apparent on the fact of the 
record. 
5. Invalidity of alleged contract of July 3rd, 
1920, both as illegal and void and as voidable at Wertz's 
election. 
MISTAKES OF COURT AS SHOWN BY THE· 
RECORD AS TO FACTS NOT QUESTIONED 
That the Court's premises are erroneous as to 
the following facts, we need only to refer to the record. 
1. We find in the opinion the allegation that-
"No complaint is made of the form of the advertise-
ment, or of its terms." 
The record shows that complaint was made as 
to both for one of the main facts relied upon in the 
original bill, Vol. 1-111-115 is that as a condition 
precedent to the right to insert the advertisement of 
sale in the newspaper, the Trustee had first to give 
complainant an opportunity to name the terms upon 
which the residue was to be paid, and that no such 
opportunity had been given. That complainant did 
not authorize McNulty to insert the terms stated in 
the advertisement as to the residue, whiGh terms had to 
-be inserted in the advertisement, and, that McNulty, 
having failed to make such request, the insertion of the 
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advertisement was objectionable and illegal as well as 
the terms, as to resi'due· ·the ;record clearly shows that 
one of the main is~t1e8 ·upon this appeal is that, there 
was no legal advertisement of the terms as to the resi-
due, in accordance with the decision of this Court in 
the cases of Preston vs. Johnston, 105 Va. 238, Tabbett 
vs. Goodman, 136 Va. 535, and Morris vs. Scruggs, . 
147 Va. 166-176-177. These objections both to the 
advertisement and the terms of sale advertised, were 
put in issue upon this appeal, page 12 of the Brief of 
appellant. 
II. In the opinion at page 4, the following 
appears: 
"While disClaiming any intention to 
charge fraud, this plaintiff then, in sub-
stance, proceeds to make such a charge, 
and says that MeN ulty misled him by 
this statement, "that he (McNulty) said 
that he had complied with everything," 
from which it is argued that McNulty de-
ceived him in saying that the property 
had been properly advertised when it had 
.not." 
As seen the Court finds as a fact that: 
''All charges of fraud are expressly withdrawn." 
That the court was altogether mistaken we have but 
to simply refer to the record-petition for appeal pages 
5 and 6, where it appears that the court is in error. 
"Brushing aside, therefore, the question of value 
·of the land for the present, the questions arising prior 
to the deed of trust of May 22, 1917, and all questions 
of fraud, save the action of the private loan by the 
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trustee of $20,000.00 to W. B. Clay when he purchased 
the land, and the questions of fraud and illegality sur· 
rounding and arising out of the contract of 41luly jrd, 
.I920," the following are the questions before the court 
for consideration." 
As to the contract of July 3, 1920, if that con-
tract is illegal ai:Id void or voidable, at Wertz's election, 
by reason of either of the two its illegality or the fraud 
of the trustee, or for any other causes, the whole decision 
falls. By referring to the petition for appeal, pages 5 
and 6, 19 and 20 and 61 to 79, both inclusive, and in the 
brief making the petition a part of the brief, at pages 5 
. and 6, and in the reply brief at pages 6 to 11, both 
inclusive, it will be seen that the whole case as to this 
contract is based on that contract being illegal and void 
or voidable, by reason of fraud or mistake. R. Vol. I, 
p. 74 to 79. 
In the original bill plaintiff set up that there 
was a conspiracy between Clay and McNulty, Trustee. 
Upon this appeal all charges of conspiracy prior to 
May 22, 1917, were waived. But expressly not waived 
as to contract of July 3, 1920, and nowhere, in this suit, 
was the fraud charged in the bill waived as to the con-
tract of July 3rd, I92o. · 
Not only does the court state at page 2 as a fact 
that-
41All charges of fraud are expressly withdrawn" 
when as seen such charges were never withdrawn. But 
at page ·4 the court reiterates that statement and 
charges a waiver of fraud on the part of Wertz, and· 
yet a reliance on fraud which had been waived. This, 
we submit, is an erroneous conclusion. 
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III. In the decision of the Court at p. 5 the 
following appears: 
"The contract of July 3, in terms shows that 
he (Wertz) thought the advertisement was defective," 
and waived all errors past and future. The very state-
ment that Wertz agreed to pay $2,000.00 for a 10 days 
extension when if he had known of any defects he only 
had to obtain an injunction and get 30 days sufficient 
to obtain loan that he needed in which to obtain same 
of itself shows that Wertz did not know of any defects, 
and likewise that Fox, his attorney, knew nothing of such 
defects. 
IV. In the opinion the court states as a fact 
that the advertisement "and its sufficiency was in the 
minds of the parties. Manifestly its insufficiency had 
been suggested." It is clear that its insufficiency was 
not suggested by Wertz, Ball or Fox for the statement 
of the court, if true, would be to hold that Fox knew 
the defects and agreed that his client should waive them 
all and pay $2,ooo.oo for nothing. 
McNulty had fixed the value of his compensa-
tion in a previous advertisement requiring exactly the 
same amount of work at $20.00. (Record vol. 11 p. 
1162-63.) We know Mr. Fox and his reputation is 
not open to such an imputation. It is certain that 
neither Wertz nor Ball nor Fox knew of any defects, 
or else they would never have agreed to pay $2,000.00, 
when all they had to do was to have the Trustee en-
joined. 
Fox testified that he knew nothing of the facts 
or the law applicable to those facts. Vol. 2 p. 669. 
That he did not know that the law required that the 
newspaper files should be examined and that he did 
not examine them, and therefore, knew nothing of 
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Wertz's rights in this matter. That Fox was in error 
as to the law is fully settled by repeated decisions in 
Virginia, but no others need be cited than Smith vs. 
Woodard, Supra. Fox knew nothing of any defects 
save that it was advertised for July 5 (July 4th holiday) 
and his opinion being that such day was a good day to 
sell, it did not constitute any defect. (R. Vol. 2 p. 669.) 
That he suggested no defect to McNulty is shown by 
Fox's evidence, Vol. 11 p. 669. 
As McNulty's statements against interest may 
be taken as evidence at page 841 vol. 2, he testified-
"Q. Did Mr. Wertz or Mr. Fox, or anybody else ever 
suggest that the terms of sale were in any wise objec-
tionable? A. No, sir, they raised no objection. Did 
not specify any objection-no specific objection. Q. 
Did they raise any objections of any kind? A. No, 
they raised no objections of any kind to it, and when I 
asked Mr. Fox what the objections were he did not 
specify any at all but said you can always drum up or 
or get up objections to a sale." 
V. In the opinion of the Court at page 5 it is 
stated: 
"Certainly he (Wertz) had a copy of it," 
(the con tract). Appellees did not make such contention 
nor is there any evidence in the record to support it. The 
fact as to who held all copies of the contract appears 
in Ball's evidence, R. Vol. 1, p. 200, whose evidence is 
. shown to be absolutely correct by incontestable record 
evidence, which admits of no doubt. 
FACTS AS TO CONTRACT 
Both copies of this ·contract were in the hands 
of McNulty. and Fox, Wertz's attorney. Ball's evi-
dence, R. Vol. 1, p. 200, but unknown to Fox. Appel-
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lant made every possible effort to get an opportunity 
to see the same and its very.existence was denied by 
both McNulty (Rec. 1, p. 408), and by Fox (Agreed 
Facts. R. Vol. 1, p. 465-466.) That. before any an-
swer was filed to the original bill this contract of July 3, 
1920, wasshown by McNulty to Clay's Attorney who 
did not set up the same, nor did McNulty in his answer 
say one word of his having that contract in his answer. 
McNulty told Moomaw that there was no such con-
tract but that if he was mistaken and there was such 
a contract that he would phone him as soon as he ex-
amined his file, but he never phoned. While on the 
other hand plaintiff, not having any copy of the contract 
but hunting in his old papers for it, found the check for 
$50.00 paid by him to Fox. as retainer, as stated by 
Ball before the check was found, and upon its pro-
duction to Fox, the copy Fox had as Wertz's attorney, 
was produced at once. (Rec. Vol. 1, p. 465-466. 
Agreed Facts). Plaintiff at once amended his bill, set 
up that, since the filing of the original bill that the 
contract had been found in Mr. Fox's possession. 
Plaintiff sought no relief or right under that contract, 
but did what he should have done in common honesty. 
and fair dealing in his view of the relation of Attorney 
to the court, and filed the same with his amended 
bill, (Rec. Vol. 1, p. 144-145) alleging in said bill at 
p. 146, that it was illegal and therefore absolutely void 
or voidable at Wertz's election, having been entered 
into, executed and delivered on Sunday, July 4th, 1920. 
At page 144 appellant charged that the said contract 
was an: 
"unconscionable contract, extorted from 
complainant under the necessity of his 
case by duress, coercion, compulsion, 
oppression and fraud." 
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TP.at contract is in no wise ambiguous, but speaks for 
itself. Appellant has not waived any charge of fraud 
there made. 
. This contract on its face is of more weight than 
the statement of any witness. Parr. v. Saunders, 11 
S. E. 981, and Sanderson vs. Bell, 153 S. E. 652, and 
contains documentary evidence that cannot be denied, 
and conclusively shows that what plaintiff charges in 
his bill is sufficient to confer on Wertz the right to have 
same decreed null and void when he found that the 
facts upon which he entered into same were not as 
represented to him by McNulty whether intentionally, 
or by mistake, it not making any difference as to· his 
right to have the same declared void. In either event 
we feel that the court has altogether fallen into error 
as to the value of McNulty's evidence as appears from 
the decision; that the court has altogether based its 
decision on his statements, notwithstanding the record 
clearly shows that no statement of his standing alone 
should be relied upon, a state of facts evidently not 
considered by the court. Again this court nowhere 
makes reference to the evidence of C. A. Ball, a wholly 
disinterested witness, whose evidence is sustained in 
every statement made, before the documentary evidence 
was shown to be accurate in every respect, nor does the 
court refer to the evidence of appellant. 
VI. In the decision of the Court at page 2 this 
statement of fact appears: 
"This Trustee, before advertising, 
saw Mr. Wertz and explained to him the 
situation, in reply to which Wertz said 
that the Trustee would have to sell since 
he could do nothing." 
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The opm10n shows that in making the above -
statement or findings of fact, the court has accepted 
C. S. McNulty's statement without any foundation in 
fact as a fact, when, as will be shown later, this court can 
not do so; for no statement of his without absolute, 
independent, corroborative evidence, can as we believe, 
be considered or taken as evidence in this case. That 
finding is only one of McNulty's Various errors of 
statement and not only is contradicted by C. R. Wertz, 
but is conclusively shown to be error by the evidence of 
R. W. Kime and R. S. Kime, which, taken together 
with their files conclusively show that said statement 
is wholly without foundation. 
There is not one line of evidence supporting 
McNulty's Statement, therefore this finding of the 
Court is not only not supported by the record, but as 
seen is wholly without any foundation in fact. 
The statement in the opinion that Werrz said 
to McNulty "to go ahead and sell the property, that he 
could do nothing" was made by McNulty-Vol. 2 
page 872-873 where he testified "that on the 15th of 
May, 1920 R. W. Kime and Wertz came to his office 
and that Wertz said to McNulty-"Mr. Kime has 
fallen down on me, and has not gotten that loan through 
and there is nothing to do but for you to sell it", and 
therefore, 41 1 knew Mr. Kime and Mr. Wertz were 
fully advised of the fact that I was going to advertise 
it and the terms of the advertisement, and the day of 
the advertisement." Wertz, Vol. 1 page 245-246, 
testifies that he did not know that the property was 
even advertised for sale until after it had appeared in 
the newspaper for some time, and that McNulty never 
requested him to name the terms or gave him any 
opportunity to name the terms as to the residue. 
Wertz's evidence is conclusively sustained by the 
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evidence of R. W. Kime and R. S. Kime, and .their evi-
dence is shown to be correct by their files, the contents 
of which are agreed to be as stated at p. 529, Vol. 1. 
VII. McNulty's Statement of Full Compliance. 
As to the fact whether or not McNulty 
made the statement that "he had complied with every-
thing" four men have testified and their evidence must 
be weighed-1st; as to McNulty's evidence by reason 
of his eight or more errors hereafter set out, and shown 
to be erroneous by his own evidence and documentary 
evidence, as well as by the evidence of totally disinter-
ested witnesses, this court should disregard any state-
ment of his denying that Wertz, Fox and Ball were 
in his office on Sunday morning, July 4th, 1920. Rec. 
II, page 839. 
In the opinion of the lower court, Vol. 2, 
page 1094, it found as a fact that McNulty did make the 
statement, "that he had fully complied." 
As is seen from the decision, this court has 
accepted McNulty's statement as true, both as to this 
statement, and the preceding statement, and before 
going further we wish to specifically point out the eight· 
statements of the trustee without any foundation made 
by McNulty,· and show that his evidence cannot be 
considered, standing alone, as sufficient upon which to 
base a decision. 
McNULTY'S ERRONEOUS 
STATEMENTS OF FACTS 
At pages 13-14 and 15 of said brief the state-
ments of facts made by McNulty as to this and other 
facts are proven to be erroneous by disinterested 
evidence, and the familar rule of falsus in uno falsus 
11 
in ·omnibus was invoked at page ·15 of said petition. 
No where on this appeal was this objection withdrawn. 
1. ln McNulty's answer to the original bill 
he stated as a fact that C. R. Wertz was present .in 
person at the Court House on Monday, noon, July 5, 
1920. (Rec. Vol. I, page 132). His allegation is-
"That on July 5, 1920, at the time 
and place fixed for sale in said advertise-
ment, said Trustee, complainant, auction-
eer and others being present, said Trustee 
opened said sale, and at the request of 
complainant, and in complainant's pres-
ence, adjourned said sale to the 16th day 
of July, 1920, at the same hour and place 
and the auctioneer publically cried such 
adjournment; that this respondent ad-
journed said sale to the date requested by 
the complainant who, in making said 
request for adjournment, stated that if he, 
complainant, did not redeem the property 
before such adjourned date that the trus-
tee, on said adjourned date, "should go 
ahead and sell the property" and he, the 
said complainant, at the time agreed that· 
said sale should be made by said Trustee 
on said date without any objection on his 
part." 
That Wertz was not present at the Courthouse on 
July 5th was proven by J. L. Kelly at Rec. Vol. 1 
-p. 214-215. 
Wertz, Rec. Vol. 1 page 248-9 testified that he 
was not present. In answers of appellees it is not only 
set up that Wertz was present but that Wertz in per-
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son requested that the sale be postponed ten days and 
in addition that Wertz in making such request, used 
the following language: · 
''Should go ahead and sell the property.'' And 
that Wertz then and there further agreed that the sale 
should be made without objection, the language of the 
answer being: 
"And he, the said complainant, at 
the time agreed that said sale should be 
made by said Trustee on said date with-
out any objection on his part." 
McNulty, when contradicted by Kelly, a totally 
disinterested witness who knew being Clerk of the 
Auctioneer, ·admitted that his statements made in .. ,. 
answer to the court were in error, but that the Agents 
of Mr. Wertz, were present, Fox and Ball being the 
only two agents of Wertz in the transaction. The 
language used in the answer cannot be made to mean 
what McNulty, in his sworn evidence, attempted to 
make it mean. His evidence that Wertz's agents 
Were there is equally erroneous. 
McNulty's second error, Vol. 2 Rec. Page 
McNulty testified that: 
"It was sometime during the morn-
ing, Monday morning, and I had to go up 
to the Court House and continue the 
sale. When I say Mr. Wertz was there, 
I mean Mr. Wertz or his Agents, I do not 
mean Mr. Wertz in person." 
The only two agents of Wertz were H.· M. Fox and 
C. A. Ball. Fox, at page Rec. Vol. 2-647-testified: 
"I did not go up to see because I took 
Mac's word for it." 
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Ball, Rec. Vol. 1 page 535 testified: 
are-
"That he (Ball) and Mr. H. M. Fox 
were the only Agents of C. R. Wertz, 
and that he does not know whether Mr. 
Wertz or Mr. Fox were there or not, as· 
he (Ball) was not there. That he did not 
gb to the court house on Monday morn-
ing, July 5, 1920, but that he did go to 
Lynchburg on that day to see E. N. New-
man. That he (Ball), H: M. Fox and C. 
R. Wertz went to McNulty's Office on 
Sunday morning, July 4th, at which time 
the contract, dated July 3, 1920 was 
drawn and executed at that time in 
McNulty's office both by McNulty, 
Trustee, and C. R. Wertz, and there was 
no need for him (Ball} to go to court 
house on Monday morning, July 5, and 
he did not go for that reason." 
(4) · The fourth and fifth errors of .McNulty's 
(a) That Wertz, in the payment of the interest 
coupons on this $40,000.00 loan was always in arrear:s; 
and 
(b) That he (McNulty) had to send the 
beneficiaries his own check and later get it when he 
could from Wertz. R. Vol. 2 page 869. Both state-
ments are shown to be absolutely without foundation 
by written evidence. The coupons were stamped paid. 
on their face by the bank and show that they were each 
paid on the day that they each matured, that is, suc;h 
coupons as were due by Wertz as the principal obligor, 
until the loan matured on May 22, 1920, when Wertz 
did make default in the payment of the interest due 
on that date as well as the principal. 
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R. W. Kime and Kime & Kime ceased to rep-
resent Wertz not later than April 15-a month and 
a half before the loan matured, and yet, McNulty 
testified that he told Kime the terms of the advertise-
ment and the day of the advertisement; the very 
statement by McNulty shows on its fact that it is an 
error: 
"From the foregoing review, it ap-
pears that in eight different instances, 
McNulty's evidence is shown to be in 
error by disinterested witnesses and writ-
ten record evidence. Therefore, in view 
of these facts, his evidence is of no value." 
FOX'S EVIDENCE 
Fox did not testify as a fact that the four men 
did not meet in said office on Sunday, July 4th, 1920. 
He was not certain. R. Vol. II, 673. 
Fox's evidence is questioned, not that Fox's ve-
racity is in any way questioned, but because of his bad 
recollection shown by his own evidence to be so, which 
renders his evidence on such point of little value. It 
appears from this record that on Nov. 16, 1926, R. W. 
Kime presented to H. M. Fox a check of $50.00 executed 
by Wertz, as retainer, and upon the production of this 
check, Fox's recollection was so refreshed that he at 
once found a filein which the contract of July 3,.1920, 
had been placed by him, having prior thereto for-
gotten the contract entirely, and did not know that he 
had it in his possession-and so absolutely defective 
was his recollection-that he had forgotten on April 
15, 1928, that he had ever seen the check shown him 
on Nov. 16, 1926. Vol. 2, page 666 of the evidence Mr. 
Fox was asked-"Did you tell Mr. Ball and possibly 
Mr. Wertz also, I do not recall, that you could not do 
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anything in the matter until a retainer had been paid 
you. A. I don't think there was any retainer paid 
me in that particular matter, Mr. Kime; if so, I have 
forgotten. I know ·I would not do anything because I 
figured Wertz was· broke and busted. * * * Q. 
I show you a check in the hand-writing of C. A. Ball 
and signed by C. R. Wertz for $50.00, dated July 3, 
1920, and ask you if that is not the retainer you required 
before you were willing to do anything in the matter? 
A. If you will show me the check and it is my endorse-
ment, I will say I got the money." 
All through Mr. Fox's evidence, wherever he 
referred to any documentary evidence, and that 
evidence was produced, it was in each case directly 
opposed to Mr. Fox's recollection, so that little value, 
by inference, can be given to what he states as to who 
were in McNulty's office on Sunday morning, July 
4th, 1920. . 
WERTZ'S EVIDENCE 
It is true Wertz is an interested witness, but no 
more so than McNulty. In confirmation of Wertz's 
statement, sufficient evidence without Wertz's state-
ment, is the evidence of C. A. Ball, who testified that 
he was present on Sunday morning, and that· the 
contract was entered into, drawn and executed there. 
Such evidence should override the evidence of both 
Fox and McNulty taken in connection with the 
documentary evidence, namely, that the paper on 
which the contract was written was that used by 
McNulty and not Fox, and further, and more important 
that the contract dealt with matters known only to 
McNulty and Wertz and not known to Fox or Ball. 
See Reply Brief, pp. 27-28 & 29. 
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. Wertz's Evidence is found at pp. 246-47-48. 
R. Vol. I. 
Q. What steps did Mr. Ball take to get this 
loan? 
A. He went to Lynchburg. 
' Q. Did you make him checks? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Are those the checks filed here this morning? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When he returned from Lynchburg, what 
was the information he brought you"about the loan? 
A. That he could get the loan if he could get 
the time. 
Q. Whaf did you do? 
A. I got Mr. Ball to go to see Mr. McNulty. 
Q. What information did he bring you from 
Mr. McNulty? 
A. That he would not extend the time. 
Q. What suggestion was made to you then by 
Mr. Ball? 
A. That he would see Mr. Fox, who had been 
a law partner of Mr. McNulty, about getti~g an 
. extension of time. 
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Q. What information did he bring you back 
from Mr. [213] Fox? 
A. That he knew nothing of the case, but that 
I could pay him $50.00 and he would take it up and see 
what he could do. 
Q. Did you pay him? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When did you pay him? 
A. On Saturday evening, about 6 o'clock on 
July 3. 
Q. Is that the.· check you sent Mr. Fox? 
(Hands paper to witness). 
A. Yes, sir, because Mr. Ball made it out in his 
own handwriting, and I signed it. 
Q. · Who took the check to Mr. Fox? 
A. Mr. Ball took it to Mr. Fox. 
Q. State whether or not anything was done 
that evening with reference to the advertisement? 
A. Because of the lateness of the hour the only 
arrangement we could make was to meet Mr. McNulty 
on Sunday morning. 
Q. Who was present besides you? 
A. Mr. Ball was there, Mr. McNulty, and Mr. 
Fox, I, myself. 
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Q. What was Mr. McNulty's occupation at 
that time? 
A. He was an Attorney and he was a Trustee 
in this matter. I don't know what all occupations 
he had, but he was also a lawyer. 
Q. What did he tell you on that morning with 
reference [214] to the postponement of this sale, in 
the beginning? 
A. That he would not do it. 
Q. -Did he say what he had done with refer-
enc~ to the advertisement of the property? 
A. He said he had complied with everything; 
and had worried over it, and was going to sell it. They 
made an agreement then on giving me ten days ex-
tension? 
Q. Upon what condition? 
. A. That I would pay Mr. McNulty the same 
sum of money if I obtained a loan, that he would have 
the same amount of money that he would have for 
selling the property-a commission of $2000, was the 
commission charged. 
Q. What was your condition mentally and 
physically at that time? 
A. It was just wretched. 
Q. What was the trouble? 
A. I was a mere physical wreck. 
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Q. Why? 
A. For the reason of losing a lifetime saving, 
all rolled up in a little ball. 
Q. Where was this contract 'of July 3, 1920, 
drawn up and signed? 
A. This is the contract that was written Sun-
day morning and agreed to by Mr. McNulty and signed 
by him and myself. 
Q. Where was that contract written? 
A. In Mr. McNulty's office. 
[215] Q. Where did you and Mr. McNulty sign it? 
A. At his office. 
Q. What became of that contract after it was 
signed-what I want to get at is did you have a copy 
of it? 
A. No, I did not. 
Wertz's evidence is clear, dir~ct and positive. 
None of the facts testified to by 
Wertz are controverted except by Mc-
Nulty, and in each instance where Wertz's 
evidence is contradicted by McNulty,· 
Wertz is corroborated, and his statement 
shown to be absolutely true by dis-
interested witnesses, and documentary 
evidence. 
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Ball's evidence. R.Vol. I, page 199-200 . 
. Ball is totally a disinterested witness. 
Before this suit was instituted and before any 
contract was produced, Ball was interviewed by 
Moomaw and told him (Moomaw), that he had 
represented Wertz in June and July, 1920, in an effort 
to procure a loan for Wertz on his property. Ball 
further stated to Moomaw, at that interview: 
"That the sale had been postponed and that 
there was a written agreement between Mr. McNulty 
and Wertz with reference to the postponement, which 
had been entered into on Sunday, the 4th day of July, 
in Mr .. McNulty's office, by which agreement, according 
to his recollection, Wertz agreed to pay Mr. McNulty 
$2,000.00 if he would postpone the sale for ten days. 
R. Vol. I, page 408: 
At the same time Ball also told Moomaw that 
Wertz had to pay Fox a fee of $50.00 before he would 
undertake the job. R. Vol. I, page 414. 
This appears at page 417, R. Vol. I: 
"Q. When you all went to see Ball in August 
after Mr. Wertz ha:d told you that Ball had something 
to do with the matter in 1920, did Ball tell you who 
drew the contract?" 
"A. He told me that it was prepared and 
signed in McNulty's Office on Sunday morning, July 
4th, and that Mr. Horace Fox and McNulty were 
there, but exactly who prepared it, whether he· told it 
or not." 
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"Q. He told you that Fox represented Wertz 
in connection with it?" 
"A. Yes. The main thing we were after was it 
put us on the track that there was a written contract 
with reference to the postponement, and we wanted 
to see what it was, especially as Mr. Ball had under-
taken to relate about"the $2,000.00 to be paid." 
From the foregoing it will be seen, that three 
pertinent, evidential facts, all in writing appear: 
1. The $50.00 check to Fox, dated 
July 3, 1920: 
2. The executed copy of the coil-
tract of July 3, 1920, found in the hands 
of Mr. Fox: 
3. The executed copy of the same 
contract found in the hands of C. S. 
McNulty: 
Ball's Evidence is found in Vol. I, p. 198-99-200: 
Q. What did you say to Mr. McNulty, and 
what did he say to you, in regard to. an extension for the 
postponement of the sale? 
A. I don't remember the exact conversation, 
but I asked him to give me an extension for thirty days. 
Q. What did he tell you? 
A. He refused me flatly first. 






A. He said he was going to sell the property, 
that he was tired of fooling with it? 
Q. What did you then do? 
A. I told Mr. Wertz that I could not get it 
extended and advised him to see Mr. Horace Fox, that 
·he and Mr. McNulty were good friends and perhaps he 
could get it extended, ·or perhaps get him a loan. 
Q. Did you go to see Mr. Fox? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do· you recall the exact times you went to 
see Mr. [135] Fox about this matter after your return 
from Lynchburg? 
A. I don't remember the exact times; Mr. 
Fox said he did not have any money at that time, but 
he would be willing to take it up with Mr. McNulty, 
but he would have to have his fee in advance. 
Q. Did he state how much? 
A. $50.00. 
Q. I hand you check of C. R. Wertz for $50.00 
to H. M. Fox and ask yoU: whether or not this check 
is the retainer which was given to Mr. Fox in the 
matter, If so, please file it as "Exhibit 3~." 
A. Yes, sir, I drew this check and Mr. Fox 
endorsed it. I file it as requested, marked "Exhibit 
3~." 
Q. Was that check delivered to Mr. Fox? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Do you recall just when and where it was 
delivered to him? 
A. I delivered it to Mr. Fox late Saturday 
afternoon in his office in the old First National Bank 
Building. 
Q. On July 3, 1920?. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. About what time in the aftern.oon? 
A. It was late in the afternoon. 
Q. Who went with you? 
A. No one. 
Q. Do you know whether or not Mr. Fox went 
to see [136] Mr. McNulty about any extension? 
A. Yes, sir, he said he had an engagement with 
Mr. McNulty in Mr. McNulty's office on Sunday 
morning, July 4. · · 
Q. Did you. go there? 
A. Yes, sir. 
· Q. About what time did you get there? 
A. About 11 o'clock, as well as I remember. 
Q. Who else was present on tha·t occasion be-
sides you and Mr. Fox? 
A. ·Mr. Fox and Mr. Wertz and Mr. McNulty 
~nd myself, I think. 
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Q. Just detail what happened in Mr. Mc-
Nulty's office that Sunday morning? 
A. We discussed the matter and Mr. Fox asked 
him for thirty days extension of the sale and Mr. 
McNulty refused it and finally he consented to give him 
ten days. I told him I did not think I could do any-
thing in ten days but that time was decided on. 
Q. So you decided on that that morning. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. After that had been decided on, what else 
did you decide? 
A. McNulty said he would not give him even 
the ten days unless he would give him $2000 commission. 
Q. How was that evidenced? 
A. Evidenced in the contract. 
Q. I show you a contract dated July 3, 1920, 
between C. S. MeN ulty, Trustee and Attorney for 
the lien holders, of the first part, of the Wildwood 
Corporation, and ask you if [137] this is the contract 
to which you have just referred? 
A. Yes, sir. 
(This contract is here filed marked "Exhibit 
No.4.") 
Q. I will ask you to file it as exhibit with your 
evidence No. 4. 
A. I did. 
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Q. Mr. Ball, were you present when that con-
tract was signed ? · 
A .. Yes, sir. 
Q, Did you see Mr. McNulty and Mr. Wertz 
sign it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where was that contract prepared? 
A. It was up in Mr. McNulty's office. 
Q. Prior to that morning had Mr. McNuJty 
agreed to postpone the sale for any length of time at all? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. When was the first time you learned that 
there might be an extension of even ten days? 
A. That morning. 
Q. After the contract was signed state whether 
or not you had a conversation in regard to the contract 
itself and the exactions contained in it? 
A. As well as I remember, I believe I said to 
Mr. McNulty that I believed he had overstepped the 
bounds that he didn't have a right to charge a fee for 
having it extended. 
Q. What did he say at that time? 
A. He said he would not agree to extend it 
unless he [138] had his commission, that it was over 
due. 
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Q. How long were you four gentlemen up m 
Mr. McNulty's office that morning? 
A. We was there sometime. 
Q. Who came away with you, if you recall? 
A. Mr. Wertz and I come away together as well 
as r remember. 
Q. Then while you were up there that morn-
ing the terms of the contract were agreed upon and put 
in type and signed up, were they?· 
A. Yes, sir, as well as I remember, it was. Mr. 
McNulty kept a copy, and he gave Horace Fox a copy. 
Q. After the contract was signed, what did you 
do then? 
A. On Monday I went to Lynchburg. 
VALUE OF BALL'S EVIDENCE 
It is no "thinking", "guessing" and "reckoning" 
so, with him-Ball knew what he was talking about, 
and his "recollections" were absolutely correct. Now, 
Ball being correct as to the written contract, and who 
had it in possession, his recollection as to when and where 
that contract was made, when and where executed and 
delivered, and to whom delivered, must be accepted as 
the facts of this case against any statement of McNulty's 
and the "mere recollection" and "guesses" of· Fox. 
His evidence fully sustains Wertz. In addition to this, 
Ball was the only disinterested witness; and a witness 
whose "recollections" are proven to be the facts, and to 
which must be added the facts appearing in the recitals 
in the contract itself, and the water marks in paper 




(a). In the contract it is recited that C. R. 
Wertz is the owner of all of the stock of the Wildwood 
Corporation. 
This fact was known to McNulty, but not 
known to Fox. Therefore, ·McNulty either drew the 
contract or dictated the same to a stenographer, or 
to someone who typed the contract on the machine. 
Had Fox examined the records of the Clerk's Office 
of Roanoke County, he could not have ascertained 
this fact; it was a fact with which McNulty was perfectly 
conversant, he having been a party to the decree directing 
the return of all the stock of the Wildwood Corporation 
to Wertz. R. Vol. II, 1170. 
(b). The contract of July 3, is written on paper 
having a watermark of "Worthmore Bond." 
PitH's. Bound Vol. of Exhibits, p. 
Defendants Bound Vol. of Exhibits, p. 
(c). Three deeds pro:ven to have been drawn in 
McNulty's office were produced in evidence, written 
on paper having this same watermark. 
McNulty's Ev. Vol. 2, 886-887-888. 
McNulty's copy of Contract of July 3, 
1920, filed as Exhibit with his evidence. Defts. 
Bound Vol. of Ex. p. 
WILDWOOD CORPORATION 
Fox had not represented Wertz in this matter 
or in any way comiected with the Wildwood Corpo-
ration, while McNulty was its attorney, drew the decree 
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directing that all the stock of that company be returned 
to Wertz in the suit of Wertz vs. that company, and 
McNulty. R. Vol. II, page 1170. R. Vol. I, page 
466. R. Vol. II, page 665. 
Wertz did not see Fox until Sunday morning in 
McNulty's office. R. Vol. I, p. 247. Ball, R. Vol. I, 
page 199. 
Fox was not a party to that suit. R. Vol. II, p. 
See Appellants Reply Brief, p. 27, 28 and 29. 
McNulty used Worthmore Bond and Fox used 
Baltimore Office Supply Bond. R. Vol. II, page 886. 
In addition to documentary evidence sustain-
ing both Ball and Wertz and showing that both Fox 
and McNulty were mistaken in their recollection as to 
when and where the contract was made and executed, 
is the incontestable fact appearing in the evidence of 
all four and admitted by both sides in their agreed facts 
to be a fact, as shown by the following: 
(30) About November 1, 1926, R. W. Kime 
asked Mr. H. M. Fox if he had represented Mr. Wertz 
in July, 1920 in connection with the advertisement of 
C. R. Wertz's land by C. S. McNulty, Trustee, and 
Mr. Fox at that time told Mr. Kime that he did not 
represent Mr. Wertz. 
Later, to-wit: on November 16, 1926, R. W. 
Kime went again to Mr. Fox's office and told Mr. Fox 
that Mr. Charles A Ball had stated that he, Ball, 
knew that Mr. Fox did represent Mr. Wertz. At 
that time Mr. Kime told Mr. Fox that Mr. Wertz had 
found his check for $50.00, retainer in that case and 
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handed the same to Mr. Fox and asked Mr. Fox to 
examine his old files to see whether or not he could 
refresh his memory. Thereupon Mr. Fox did examine 
his old files and therein did find the original contract 
dated July 3, 1920, and did thereupon hand that con-
tract to Mr. R. W. [566] Kime. The contract handed 
Mr. Kime is the original executed copy of the contract 
heretofore set out in this agreed statement of facts. 
Prior to November 16, 1926, Mr. H. M. Fox had 
told both Mr. R. W. Kime and Mr. W. W. Coxe that 
he, Fox, did not represent C. R. Wertz in July, 1920, 
.and .that he did not know anything about the facts, and 
had no connection with the matter, and that .Mr. 
Charles A. Ball was entirely mistaken; so completely 
had the whole transaction passed from Mr. Fox's re-
membrance until he found his file on November 16, 
1926. 
Absolute Proof of the Correctness of Ball's Evidence. 
The incontestable proof that cannot be ques-
tioned showing Ball's evidence to be correct, is that 
before the contract was produced and before the check 
for $50.00 was produced, and while Fox was denying 
that he ever represented Wertz, Ball stated that he, 
Ball, employed Fox to represent Wertz and that before 
Fox would accept employment he demanded that he be 
paid $50.00 retainer, and that he, Ball, wrote the 
check and Wertz signed it and that he delivered it to 
Fox on late Saturday evening. That on Sunday 
morning Fox, McNulty, Ball and Wertz met at 
M·cNulty's office and entered into a contract that 
morning. That the contract was put in writing, 
executed and delivered, McNulty keeping the original 
and Fox keeping the executed carbon ·copy. That in it 
McNulty charged Wertz $2,000.00 to postpone the sale 
for 10 days at which time McNulty was also denying 
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that any such contract was made. · Later the check 
was found written in Ball's handwriting dated July 3, 
1920, signed by Wertz, endorsed by Fox, and cashed 
July 6th. When this check was presented to Fox he 
forthwith produced his file in which was the carbon 
executed copy containing exactly what Ball had said it 
contained. After this executed contract was produced, 
McNulty produced the original contract from his file. 
When the check was produced it was written by Ball 
and signed by Wertz. 
We are forced to conclude as to when the 
contract of July 3rd, was written that it was written 
on Sunday morning July 4th, 1920, in McNulty's 
office. 
We say this, because of the unshaken evidence 
of C. A. Ball. Before the contract was found he told 
both attorneys, Moomaw and Coxe, where it would be 
found and what the contract would contain. It was 
found as stated, and contained what he stated it would. 
contain. 
Compared with the doubtful recollection of both 
McNulty and Fox on this point, such positive and cor-
roborated evidence of Ball should, beyond doubt, be 
accepted as the facts of the case. It is impossible for 
Ball or any other person to make such a statement as 
Ball made, and later be completely corroborated, and 
be in error. 
Illegal Contract 
His evidence conclusively shows the contract 
to have been written on Sunday July 4th, and it is 
therefore illegal for that reason alone. See Code of 
Va. Sec. 4570, then in force as the law, prohibiting 
the ···transaction of business on Sunday.,.' · 
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Being an illegal contract pleaded or not pleaded, 
argued or not argued in the lower court, it cannot be 
set up as a defense in this case. 
''The first question to be determined 
is whether that agreement is one which a 
court of equity will enforce. If it be 
an illegal contract, as claimed in argu-
ment, this suit cannot be maintained, 
although that defence was not raised by 
the pleadings, nor relied upon in the 
Circuit Court. The law refuses to enforce 
illegal contracts, as a rule, not out of 
regard for the party objecting, nor from 
any wish to protect his interests, but 
from reasons of public policy. When-. 
ever, therefore, the illegality of the con-
tract appears, whether alleged in the 
pleadings or made known for the first 
time in the evidence, it is fatal to the 
case. That defect cannot be gotten rid 
of either.by failure to plead it, or by agree-
ing to waive it in the most solemn manner. 
The law will not enforce contracts found-
ed in its violation. Fry on Spec. Per. 
sec. 309; 1 Story's Eq. 261; Pomeroy's 
Contracts, sec. 286 (2d Ed.); Coppell v. 
Hall, 7 Wall. 542." 
But the illegality of the contract was fully plead in the · 
bill in this case. R. Vol. 1, p. 146-7-8. 
And the doctrine of "in pari delicto'' has no 
application. The contract is illegal and the rights of 
the parties remain undisturbed as they existed on the 
day before it was made. 
R. C. L. pp. 816-17-18-19. 
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Upon this ground alone the con tract should be 
dismissed from consideration and the case dealt with 
as if there had been no con tract. 
Swineford Case. 154 Va. 751. 
In the light of the evidence reviewed and the 
statute Sec. 4570 prohibiting "transacting business" 
on Sunday, we submit that nothing need further be 
said, but, in addition, we wish to point out what has 
most evidently escaped the attention of Judge Holt, who 
delivered the opinion in the Swineford Case, 154 Va. 
751, where a most full consideration of the rights of a 
beneficiary secured by a deed of trust to purchase the 
property at a public sale by the trustee was under in-
vestigation; the facts as to each case are entirely dif-
ferent, yet no where is the law more clearly and better . 
set out than in that case; that is applicable to the facts 
of this case, and that had no application as is clearly 
shown in that case where the court declared the law 
to be as stated. in R. C. L. and cases supporting that 
enunciation of ·the law. Judge Holt at page of 
said case quotes and adopts the following: 
The rule relied upon by appellants is thus 
stated in 26 R. C. L. p. 1325: "Nothing in the law 
of fiduciary trusts is better .settled than that the 
trustee shall not be allowed to advantage himself 
in dealings with the trust estate. He shall not be 
allowed to serve himself under the pretense of serving 
his cestui que trust. The most usual way in which 
evasions of this salutary rule are attempted is in pur-
chases of the trust estate by or in the interest of the 
trustee. That such purchasers shall not be allowed 
the realization of their purpose is the universal ):wlding 
of the courts, except with the express consent or under 
a special permission given by a court of competent 
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jurisdiction.· This wise and salutary rule, designed to 
protect the weak and powerful, is founded upon two 
principles. The one is, that the trustee has no right 
to derive any benefit or advantage from the trust fund; 
but all his skill and labor in the management of it must 
be directed to the advancement of the interest of his 
· cestui que trust, and the other is that a trustee will not 
be permitted to create in himself an interest opposite 
to that of 'the party for whom he acts." 
"With this rule we are in cordial accord." 
In the Swineford Case, there was no question of 
compliance with the power of sale. 
As appears from the original bill in this case the 
sole issue and right is whether or not there was any 
compliance by the trustee with the condition and 
provision contained therein. 
In this case if there had been full compliance 
then whether or not the contract was valid or invalid 
cuts no figure. 
At this stage of the decision of this case, this 
decision is based on there having not been any valid 
sale and on the merits of the case that Wertz had the 
right to his property, unless he later waived all such 
reservations and limitations. 
In the Swineford case the issue was the right of 
the purchase~to buy at a sale duly complied with. · 
No such question presented in this case. 
As to this contract as Clay is not a party thereto 
he is in no wise entitled to set up that contract and a 
sale under it for the reason as this court has found as a 
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fact that he did not know of it, and therefore, his 
rights stand as to that contract as if it had never been 
executed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT IN THIS SUIT 
The original bill shows that the complainant 
based his right for relief on two main facts-
1. ·That McNulty did not continue the adver-
tisement in the newspaper as required by the deed of 
trust. R. Vol. I. p. 111. 
2. That he did not request Wertz to name the 
terms as to the residue before inserting the advertise-
ment. 
At that time the only two copies of said alleged 
contract, of July 3, 1920, were in McNulty's and Fox's 
hands, and each denied that said contract was ever 
executed. R. Vol. I. p. 200. The questions in issue 
as to both of these claims for relief are questions of 
non-compliance and if not complied with are fatal, 
without charging fraud as to the failure. to comply, 
for if the Trustee had not advertised for the requisite 
period of time and in the manner prescribed by the 
deed, the land remained Wertz's land, and if Wertz's 
land, the question of the value cuts no figure under the 
settled law of Morris vs. Scruggs, supra. If the terms 
as to the residue were not requested by McNulty, then 
no terms were advertised, under the settled law of 
Preston vs. Johnson, and other cases cited, supra. 
The reason for non-compliance whether with intent, 




ACTS OF NON-COMPLIANCE 
This court has not considered either of the two 
rights set up in the original bill, either one of which is 
sufficient to give the relief sought. If either of these 
rights have not been complied with, both or either are 
fatal without any regard as to the cause which pre-
vented compliance. If either were omitted to be done 
by mistake, ignorance, or intentionally omitted to have 
been fully complied with the cause of omission is 
entirely immaterial. Therefore, if it be that McNulty's 
failure to give Wertz an opportunity to name terms as 
to residue was through ignorance, mistake, or that he 
overlooked that it was a prerequisite, and the fact be 
that he did not do what he should have done, it is fatal. 
This is settled by what is said by this court in Tabett 
v. Goodman, 136 Va. p. 535 to be an unbroken line of 
decisions in this State. That case and Preston v. 
Johnson, 105 Va. 238, and all the former decisions 
cited in last named case are affirmed by this court in 
Morris vs. Scruggs, 147 Va. p. 174-76, and should be 
applied. 
The other right to the relief set up, namely: 
that MeN ulty failed to continue the insertion of the 
advertisement in the Roanoke Times for the full 30 
days of 24 hours each is as fatal as if he had not inserted 
the advertisement in any newspaper at all. 
The pleadings upon the appeal show that the 
most of the Briefs of appellant and appellee are devoted 
to the consideration of these two issues. 
Nothing is asked to be added to what we have 
said but we want the case heard and determined on 
the main 1ssues involved, which have not been con-
sidered. 
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We repeat that there is no difference as to the 
legal effect of acts of non-compliance with the power 
of sale in the Trustee whether the failure to comply was 
done with a fraudulent intent and was not done with 
such intent. The fact that is material is was it done, 
or left undone and if left undone-no matter what 
the cause, it is fatal. To make plain-if a deed of 
trust requires thirty days notice no matter how to be 
given, and the Trustee does not give any notice at all 
of course a deed from such trustee is void because 
not in compliance with the terms provided upon which 
the legal title might be divested. If he gives such 
notice for nine days and the requirement is ten days, 
there is no more compliance than if he had omitted 
to give the notice at all. In other words, unless he 
has done what the deed of trust requires to be done, there 
is no jurisdiction or power to alienate the land of the 
grantor conveyed to the Trustee subject to the restric-
tions. The land in such case remains the land of the 
grantor in equity in the hands of the first purchaser 
from the Trustee whether he is beneficiary or not, 
and more so where he is first purchaser and beneficiary. 
Dickerson vs. McNulty 142 Va. 559-564; Dillars vs. 
Krise, 86 Va. 410-412; Preston vs. Johnson, 105 Va. 
238-241; Smith vs. Woodward, 122 Va. 371-373; Tab-
bett vs. Goodman, 136 Va. 526-533; Wasserman vs. 
Metzger, 105 Va. 744-747; Morris vs. Scruggs, 147 Va. 
166-176-177. 
It, therefore, follows that though all fraud be 
waived as to conspiracy between McNulty and Clay 
and all fraud be waived as to McNulty's acts, both in 
his failure to comply with conditions precedent to the 
right to advertise at all, and in his failure to continue 
the advertisement in the paper for the full 30 days, 
(which McNulty considered to be necessary, and which 
is necessary) it follows that if in either he failed to com-
ply, his failure is as fatal as if he had fraudulently 
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done so; but as McNulty's fraud in the matter of the 
contract was not waived but expressly reserved, and 
the court has been misled as to what was intended to 
be waived by reason of the voluminous record in this 
case, as to the position of appellant and his reliance 
upon the fraud, duress, compulsion, coersion and 
misrepresentation of facts in conne~tion therewith fully 
. set out and argued in the case, said contract should 
be decreed void and out of the case. 
Clay Bound by Contract When he seeks its Protection. 
Clay is estopped to say that he can rely upon this 
contract, for in his answer and in his evidence both, he 
states and testifies that he knew nothing of the con-
tract until1926-therefore, he did not act on that con-
tract. After said contract was brought to his attention 
he either had the right to renounce it or not, as he 
chose, but if he elected to base his right on a deed 
from the Trustee, made by reason of said contract, 
every fraud that can be imputed to the Trustee can 
equally be imputed to him for he was the beneficia,ry 
under the deed of trust. The Trustee was his agent 
and if he accepts the benefit, he must bear the burden. 
With all due respect to this Court, this Court, as we 
are advised, cannot give to Clay, free of its illegality, 
the benefit of this illegal contract, procured by fraud, 
compulsion, and coersion and the misrepresentation of 
material facts, and in addition, one entered into and 
delivered wholly on Sunday; the fixed law of this 
State as appears from the unbroken line of decisions of 
this Court from Crump vs. Mining Co. to Strickland vs. 
Cantonwine, I40 Va. 2IJ, charging Clay with the 
burdens along with the benefits of such contract. 
Absolving, as we do, Clay from all charges of 
personalfraud, he had the absolute right to purchase 
the land if the Trustee had complied with the power 
of sale. · 
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But under all the decisions of this Court, he had 
at his peril as first purchaser, before doing so, to in-
vestigate McNulty's right to convey away Wertz's 
land. 
T~at this is required of every first purchaser 
from any Trustee qnly the case of Smith v. Woodard, 
122 Va. p. 368 to 377, and the case there approved, 
need be cited. 
It is settled in this State that a first purchaser 
has the burden of proving that the provisions of the 
deed of trust had been complied with. Gibson's heirs 
vs. Jones, 5 Leigh (32 Va.) 370. 
CLAY NOT A PURCHASER FOR VALUE 
1st: Clay was the beneficiary, and it is settled 
law that in such case he is not a purchaser for value. 
Clay was first purchaser, and it is equally settled law 
that he is not a purchaser for value. To hold otherwise 
is to set at naught all the decisions of this court. 
Contrary to what is stated at page 7 of the opinion of 
the court. There is no such thing known to the law 
as a purchaser for value where such purchaser is either 
the beneficiary or the first purchaser from the Trustee. 
He takes it with every infirmity existing in the hands 
of the Trustee. He is chargeable with every neglect of 
duty. And why not? He parts with no value. If the 
deed of trust be not foreclosed, he still has his lien on 
the land-just what he had before. He does not in any 
wise alter his situation or relation to the land, save, 
perhaps that he becomes the naked Trustee in place 
of the Trustee in whom was vested the legal title for 
the benefit of the owner, subject ~o his lien. Clay 
as such purchaser, was bound to ascertain at his peril 
that his Trustee had complied with the conditions 
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precedent to the right to advertise as well as that he 
had complied with the manner in which the adver-
tisement had been inserted in the newspaper. This 
doctrine is fully supported by Tabbett vs. Goodman-
"an unbroken line of decisions." See Johnson vs. 
Preston, 105 Va. 238; Tabbett vs. Goodman 136 Va. 
page 526; Morris vs. Scruggs, 147 Va., supra, page 166 
Smith vs. Woodward, 122 Va., supra page 371. 
Clay's Offer to take $4o,ooo.oo. 
(See page 6 of Court's opinion.) 
If this contract is discarded, as it must be, then 
either under McNulty's failure to comply with con-
ditions precedent to the right to advertise, or his 
failure to continue advertisement for a sufficient 
length of time renders what ever he did invalid. No 
legal sale having been made, Clay had nothing to offer 
for sale when he caused the auctioneer to state that he 
would sell the land for what was due by Wertz to any 
purchaser who appeared. He had nothing to offer. 
The land at the time such offer was made remained 
Wertz's land, as it is today, and Clay had no right to 
authorize the Trustee to offer to make a sale of Wertz's 
land, and, if any person interested and present at the 
sale to buy, te whom such offer was made, did his 
duty and investigated the power of the trustee to sell, 
such person knew he had nothing to offer and that the 
trustee had not complied. 
McNulty Demanded that $2,ooo.oo 
be paid to him as the price of the con-
tinuance of the sale for ten days. 
In the opinion of the Court at p. 6, the Court 
found as a fact that McNulty, Trustee, charged Wertz 
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11 too much"; that the trustee was due something for his 
services, saying, "At the utmost, all that can be said 
on behalf of Wertz, is that a Trustee, who was entitled 
to make_ some charge, charged too much." The Court 
further decided that, "Had there been a private sale, 
and if we assume that the promise to pay $2,000.00 
conditionally, as a substitute for commissions, was 
an unenforcable promise", such demand was the creating 
of a burden on the grantor who made him Trustee for 
more than the grantor owed him. 
, For his benefit alone because if Wertz had made 
a private sale, then the Trustee was entitled to no 
commission at all. See Dillard v. Serpell. 138 Va. 694. 
Smeltz Bros v. Quinn, 134 Va. 96-7. 
The trustee became entitled to nothing more 
than a reasonable sum for his services. 
MeN ulty had fixed the value of the work at 
$20.00, this being what he charged Wertz for exactly 
similar services for such service under a former deed of 
trust. R. Vol. II, p. 1162-1163. 
"NOW, THEREFORE, in consider-
ation of the premises, the said C. R. 
Wertz hereby agrees, in consideration of 
the said C. S. McNulty immediately 
withdrawing the advertisement of said 
property from the Roanoke Times to 
(a) pay to the Roanoke Times $ , 
cost of advertisement, (b) to pay to C. S. 
McNulty the sum of $20.00 for drawing 
said advertisement and for his services 
in connection therewith, * * * " 
It thus appearing from this record that McNulty 
demanded $1980.00 "toomuch." 
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The opinion of the Court finds that he charged · 
·"too much." As he did, then is not the contract unfair 
and unreasonable and illegal so to act? If the trustee 
did so act, then what shall we do with what is said 
is the settled law of Branch vs. Buckley, 109 Va. 791-92, 
and Swineford vs. Va. Trust Co. 154 Va. 761, 152 S. E. 
353. 
The opinion of the court dismisses what is said 
here about the illegal charge of $2,000.00 by saying: 
"As a matter of fact there was no 
private sale and that part of the contract 
goes out of the picture." 
This stand we feel .is contrary to law. The 
settled rule is that the validity or invalidity of any 
contract is determined not by what was done under it, 
but by what could have been done under it. 
6 R. C. L. 810, Sec. 209-813 Sec. 213. 
McNulty's intent to get a benefit for himself 
(which intent is opposed to the policy of the law) is 
in no wise any the less an illegal and unlawful act if not 
carried into execution than it would have been if 
carried into execution. "That which renders the 
contract illegal is not the injury the parties have 
actually occasioned, but the purpose they must have 
contemplated when it was made. 
Its validity is tested, not by its results, but by its 
objects as shown by its terms." Hoffman vs. Mc-
Millan U.S. Cir. Court of Apps. 83 Fed. 372-45 L. R. A. 
(Old) 410-17. 
In the case of Hardison vs. Reel 154 N. C. 273-
70 S. E. 463-34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1098 at p. 1100. The 
court said-· "The illegal purpose infects the whole 
transaction and destroys all right of action." 
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The second reason given by the Court for up-
holding the contract is that Wertz was dealing with the 
trustee "at arms length", through independent counsel. 
With this position we could agree, if the inde-
pendent counsel had, had full and complete knowledge 
of the facts with reference to what had been done by 
the trustee toward creating a power of sale and the 
contract had beenfair and reasonable, but as heretofore 
shown, the advisor did not know the facts, but relied 
on the Trustee's statement of the facts and so testified. 
Can it be that a different rule of law applies where 
an erroneous statement is made to a client in the 
presence of his Attorney and where it is made to the 
client who did not have an attorney, when that er-
roneous statement is acted upon by both the client and 
his attorney? Such a rule was attempted to be set 
up in the celebrated case of Pickering v. Pickering, 2 
Beavan, page 31-(17 Eng. Chy Repts.) To be brief, 
the testator named his son as Executor. The life 
tenant was his mother; the real issue turned on sup-
pression of the truth more than a false representation 
actually made. After the death of the father, one 
attorney for a long time represented both parties. 
Later, at the suggestion of the executor, his mother 
employed separate counsel to represent her interest 
with whom the whole matter was taken up, save that 
the essential point as· to the construction of a certain 
clause of the will was not stated to all parties, but the 
dealings were had on the basis that the will had been 
properly construed; whereas, as a matter of fact, the 
court later held it had not been, and for that reason the 
contract should be set aside. Under the advice of 
the widow's counsel, she entered into a contract 
confirming the settlement of the estate. Her attorney 
attested her signature, receipted for the money; after 
her death, when the fraud was discovered, a suit was · 
43 
brought by reason of the suppression of the truth, 
although the life tenant, the widow, had counsel of her 
own and the whole matter had been agreed to by him. 
The court held that where a trustee or anyone' standing 
in a fiduciary relation such as an executor, or trustee, 
did not disclose all that he knew or made false rep-
resentations upon which all parties acted, including 
the attorney, that relief would be granted and this, through 
competent counsel had been employed. It must be so. 
What can be the difference between a misrepresentation 
stated to a. client and the same stated to the client 
and his attorney, and this whether the representation 
was made with design or not. As stated Fox, the 
Attorney did not know the facts, made no examination 
of. the facts, and acted on the misrepresentation. · Mc-
Nulty was Trustee and while agent for both parties, 
owed a paramount duty to Wertz. The law being as 
stated in A. & G. R. R. Co. vs. A. & W. R. R. Co., 19 
Gratt., 60 Va. 616-617-"A Trustee in a Deed of trust 
is the agent of both parties; he is especially of the party 
constituting him such trustee; his duty is to be perfectly 
fair in all his conduct. Especially to see that the 
interests of the party who has conferred upon him this 
power are protected to the fullest extent." The law 
imposes on all men the duty to tell the truth, but in a 
higher sense-as thus seen-it is the duty of a trustee 
to look after the trust committed to him, and this 
duty imposes on the Trustee the fullest disclosure of all 
facts and prevents and denies to him the right to make 
any false statement, whether known to be false or not, 
either to the client or to the Attorney or to both in the 
presence of each other or to one only. To lessen this 
standard is to lessen the standard fixed by every case 
heretofore decided by this court as will be seen by a 
review of the case of Frances vs. Cline, 96 Va. 201-221 
and cases there cited. Because Wertz had employed 
Fox, did not confer on McNulty the privilege to make 
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-...... __ 
erroneous statements and escape the liability for making 
the same, on the ground that the party defrauded had 
a competent advisor, nor can those claiming under him 
set up a right and yet deny the liability for the fraud. 
No man can tell that which is untrue whether he deals 
at arms length or otherwise; it matters not. The 
law excuses no false statements-arms length or otherwise. 
While it is true that a cest qui que trust can deal 
with the trustee, it is only when everything is on the 
square. No erroneous statements, no misrepresen-
tations, no suppression of the truth will be permitted. 
Swineford vs. Trust Co., 154 Va. 751. 
The doctrine of that case is in no wise in con-
flict with the rights asserted by appellant. No where 
in that case is it held that the Trustee can make false 
statements and misrepresentations in order to obtain 
a benefit to himself-no matter that he had counsel. 
To sustain this statement that the contract 
must be "fair and honest" we refer the courts in the 
case of Woody v. Grimes 154 Va. p. 615-153 S. E. 
817 (Va.) 
The burden of proof lies, in all cases, upon the 
party who fills the position of active confidence to show 
that the transaction has been fair. If it can be shown 
to the satisfaction of the court that the other party 
had competent and disinterested or independent advice, 
or that he performed the act or entered into the tran-
saction voluntarily, deliberately and advisedly, knowing 
its nature and effect, and that his consent was not 
obtained by reason of the power of influence to which 
the relation gave rise, the transaction will be sup-
ported." 
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· In Adams on Eq. (8th Ed.) it is said: "There 
is no positive rule that he cannot deal with his cestui 
que trust; but in order to do so, he must fully divest 
himself of all advantage which his character as trustee 
might confer, and must prove, if the transaction be after-
wards impugned, that it was in all respects fair and 




In the Court's Decision, page 3, it appears: 
"However sufficient or insufficient this ad-
vertisement may be, is of small moment, for its insuf-
ficiency, if it be insufficient, has been waived." 
Again at p. 4: 
"In the contract which was executed pursuant 
to the agreement reached, it was three times declared 
that as a part of the consideration therefor Wertz 
waived every objection of any kind and character which 
he then had or might thereafter have to the sale, and 
said that if it should be that the trustee would finally 
have to sell, he might sell without any objection on his 
part.". 
And again at p. 6. 
"In the instant case, this contract is supported 
by two considerations. One is a promise to waive 
defects in procedure, and in the other an agreement to 
pay, in the event of a private sale, a sum which would 
have equalled the trustee's commissions had the prop-
erty been sold at public auction." 
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11 Had there been a private sale, and if we assume 
that the promise to pay $2,000.00 conditionally, as a 
substitute for commissions was an unenforceable promise, 
(ours) it would not affect the validity of the contract of 
July 3rd. That contract would still stand as a promise 
to waive all defects in procedure in consideration of an 
extension of time." 
See also p. 7 of Court's opinion. 
11At the utmost, all that can be said is that he 
should have known that Wertz had claimed that some 
defects in fact existed; but had waived them." 
It is with the utmost candor when we say that; 
this Court being of the opinion that we had waived all 
charges of fraud and illegality as to this contract would 
be fully justified in holding that Wertz was bound if 
there had not been the agreement to also pay $2,000.00. 
But as we have shown to the Court that the Court was 
altogether in error as to fraud and illegality being waived 
and therefore upon a rehearing this court will hold 
that it was an illegal contract (1) because fully made 
and delivered on Sunday, (2) that it was an illegal 
or a voidable contract because as shown, McNulty 
deceived Fox and Wertz whether intentionally or 
fraudulently, it matters not, when he said that he had 
fully complied with every requirement in the deed of 
trust and could and would sell, and his statement was 
accepted and acted upon, neither Fox or Wertz having 
any knowledge of defects. 
If McNulty knew the defects it was deceit and 
therefore and illegal contract. If he did not, it was a 
mutual mistake and voidable at Wertz's election, (3) 
Because as this court has found, the trustee exacted too 
much money to be paid in event the debt was paid off 
and no sale, therefore; an illegal contract. 
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This Court will in our opm1on set aside· its 
present judgment and then proceed to hear the case 
on its real merits set up in the original bill. 
If, however, we are mistaken in this, we as 
candidly say that the Court has misapprehended the 
law as it did the facts and wish to direct attention to 
what we believe to be the settled law; that in no· case 
can a trustee, no matter that the ces qui trustant had 
counsel enforce a contract for his own benefit that the law 
condemns as void by reason of public policy and therefore 
illegal. 
The polar star by which any trustee is to be 
guided is that he shall in all things especially protect 
the interest of the grantor who reposed confidence in 
him and that confidence cannot be betrayed for the 
private benefit and gain of the trustee. 
1 Perry on Trusts (6th Ed.) Sec. 
275, p. 472, & Sec. 428, p. 688. A. & G. R. 
R. Co. vs. A. & W. R. R. Co., 19 Grat. 
60 Va. 616-617. Swineford vs. Virginia 
Trust Co. 154 Va. 751. 
The trustee also for the protection of the lender 
has no right to make any sale on a defective advertise-
ment for it endangers loss by the public being afraid 
to buy and in buying get a bad title. 
Wolf. v. Ward, (Mo) 16 S. W. 167, Dillard vs. 
Krise. 86 Va. 412. 
The record, as heretofore shown by the evidence 
of every witness, McNulty and Fox included, shows 
that neither Fox or Wertz knew of any defects what-
ever. R. Vol. I. Petition for Appeal, p. 106-7-8. 
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No Waiver Without Full Knowledge. 
It is an axiom of the law as old as the law itself, 
that no man can waive his rights without full knowledge 
of those rights, and in no state has that principle of 
law been more clearly stated than in the unbroken line 
of decisions of this state. Reference need only be made 
to the cases of Milboro Co. vs. Augusta Corporation, 
140 Va. 409-417-420 and the cases there cited, and 
especially to the case of Swineford vs. Va. Trust Co. 
(Supra). This · review of the evidence shows that 
Wertz, Ball and Fox did not know of the defect, an& 
the burden is on the trustee in this case to prove that 
they did know it. Woddy vs. Grimes 154 Va. 615. 
Whether McNulty knew it or not is immaterial, for 
the law ·is as well settled as any principle of law can be 
that it is entirelv immaterial whether the statement 
was made by MeN ulty knowing it to be false, or whether 
he knew it to be false or not, the result is the same. 
And further-by the settled law of this state, the burden 
is cast on the appellee to show by clea_r evidence that 
admits of no doubt that appellant did not rely upon 
such statement. Lynhart vs. Foreman, 77 Va. 540-
544-545; Lowe vs. Trundle, 78 Va: 65-67-68-69; Canton-
wine vs. Strickland, 140 Va. 193-213 and cases there 
cited. 
Waiver of Past and Future Errors. 
The exaction demanded by MeN ulty that 
Wertz waive and release all errors is tantamount to the 
exaction that Wertz release and abrogate all the 
provisions in the deed of trust creating restraints upon 
the power of alienation by the Trustee contained in said 
deed of trust in consideration of a ten day postpone-
ment of sale. Its effect is to give to the Trustee the 
right to advertise and sell as he wished-to do with 
. Wertz's property as he chose, and that, no matter what 
49 
he did, Wertz waived all errors. A Trustee cannot 
make such an exaction. It is unfair and unreasonable 
and contrary to law as declared by Holt ]. in Swineford 
v. Trust Co. (Supra). The exaction of the payment of 
$2000. is excessive and therefore "unenforceable" be-
cause it is an "illegal act", as heretofore shown, but 
that exaction in its terpitude, is nothing to be compared 
with the exaction demanded by MeN ulty of the waiver 
and release of all errors. This exaction is nothing short 
of duress, coersion and compulsion, as stated by Justice 
Brewer in Harmony v. Bing-148 U. S. 581. The 
trustee held within himself a postponement of the sale 
which was Wertz's as a matter of right. To obtain what 
belonged to him a waiver of all defects was demanded, 
"exacted" and given. 
Of this exaction the lower court in its righteous 
indignation upon the first appeal (and there is no 
evidence to contradict the contract upon which that 
opinion was rendered) said "The Trustee's duties 
were fixed by law, and the instrument under which he 
was acting, and it was a further breach of his trust to 
exact waiver of defect and objection to his sale as the 
price of a continuance." 
At page (6) of the Brief of appellant will be 
found those cases holding that such demand was 
nothing short of compulsion, coersion or duress. No 
matter by what name designated, it was illegal and a 
.fraud and such a fraud that rendered the whole of the 
contract void. 
Strict' Compliance in Advertisement 
and Terms of Sale required. 
The Court in its opinion at p. 3 states: 
"In justice to the trustee, however, it should be 
said in passing that there was manifestly no purpose 
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in doing less then his duty. Substantially, he did all 
and more than all that is required of him." 
The settled law in this state, without any exception 
is that the notice has to be given as provided in deed 
of trust, that every prerequisite to the insertion of the 
advertisement has to be done as required. 
In Preston v. Johnson this Court adopted the 
case of Sears vs. Livermore, in which case the court 
said as to the trustee having advertised in a much more 
advantageous manner than provided in the deed of 
trust that it goes for naught if what is required was not 
done at p. 564, 85 Am. Dec. the law which our court 
has adopted in Preston v. Johnson, (Supra) is thus 
stated: 
"The principle is undisputed and 
fundamental that directions in powers of 
sale must be strictly, literally, and precisely 
pursued, and admit of no equivalent or 
substitution, however unessential they 
might otherwise have been. * * * * 
This was the test of value which the 
grantor thought proper to require, and 
it was not competent for the trustee to 
establish any other, although by doing so 
he might, in reality, promote the interest 
of those for whom he acted. * * * 
That notice of sale was thus more gener-
ally known and more persons called to 
the sale, than if given according to the 
terms of the deed, can make no difference. 
The parties agreed upon one notice, at one 
place and for twenty days. * * * 
The law allows no substitution. To the 
parties under such an . instrument as 
this the contract furnished the law. 
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Without the notice which they have 
agreed upon there is no power to 
sell; there is no jurisdiction." 
Perry on Trusts (3rd Ed.) p. (§) 602. 
This had been the rule in this state prior to 
Preston v. Johnson, Supra, and has been followed in 
every case smce. 
In the last case decided of Morris v. Scruggs, 
147 Va., it is followed. 
This court, at p. 174, saying "the sale must 
conform to the terms stated in the deed." 
To such an extent does the requirement both 
as to terms of sale have to be followed that it is not in 
the power of the court or the legislature to vary or alter 
them. That the court cannot depart therefrom, al-
though to do so would be to increase the amount that 
could be realized from a sale of the property. New 
York Life Ins. Co. vs. Kennedy, 146 Va. 205. 
Thus, it is seen that the fixed law in this state 
is that there can be no substitution as to either. 
It was relying on these decisions that this suit was 
instituted. 
Now, as to why McNulty put advertisement of 
sale in this instance in two newspapers when he had 
never done so in any other case, the record does not 
show, but as to what he did, the record shows clearly 
that in no other of the many advertisements that he 
had put it in the newspapers he never put the notice 
but in one newspaper. At p. 501, Vol. I of the record 
it appears: 
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"He didn't advertise any of the properties I have 
mentioned in two newspapers." That fact and the 
evidence supporting it is nowhere controverted. The 
record shows as well as common sense itself would . 
dictate that what he did was a disadvantage instead of 
an advantage. Had he put the advertisement in each 
daily paper for the full 30 days required and in each 
issue of each paper issued it would undeniably have 
been a more advantageous notice and though not 
required to be done it could not have damaged the sale, 
but he did not do so. In the Roanoke Times he in-
serted the notice of sale for 28 or 29 days, not 30 days, 
and in the other daily paper, the World-News, weekly. 
Now if the World-News had been a weekly paper that 
advertisement would have helped and in no way 
damaged for it would have appeared in every issue of 
that paper that came out, but by putting it in one issue 
of a daily paper, and then withholding its issuance for 
6 days in each week from that paper was a damage 
and that it was a damage is apparent without any 
evidence to show it, but the record shows that in the 
estimation of the preeminently most experienced 
real estate agent in the city who is also the oldest and 
leading auctioneer of real estate in Roanoke, Mr. J. 
W. Boswell, he considered that the putting of the 
notice in the Roanoke World-News as McNulty did 
was a serious damage and one that was calculated to 
deter bidders from attending the sale by making them 
think that the debt had been paid and the sale would 
not be had. R. Vol. I. p. 298. It was so at variance 
with the established custom of every trustee with one 
exception to insert the notice for 30 days as the paper 
was issued that any departure from that custom was 
therefore not only fatal but also misleading and a 
damage. The public considered it necessary to appear 
in every issue of the paper and if it did not appear in 
every issue, concluded that the matter had been settled 
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and that there would not be any sale. H. T. Hall, 
one of the leading lawyers in the City testified that it 
was the universal custom for it to appear each day the 
paper appeared for the full 30 days. Vol. L, p. 396-97 
and 545-46. 
It is true as stated in the court's opinion that 
some lawyers did say that they knew of no such custom, 
but it is equally as true that each one of those same 
lawyers who had ever had an advertisement to put in 
the paper at all followed the custom, and put it in every 
issue of the paper for the full 30 days. Every foreclosure 
that each one made was examined and found without a 
single exception, when 30 days was named, that they 
put it in every issue of one daily newspaper for 30 days, 
and if it was a weekly provision named in deed of trust 
once a week for 30 days, and that if they selected a 
weekly paper they published the notice of sale in each 
issue of that paper. R. Vol. I. pp. 538 to 546. 
That the public had the right to expect the notice 
of sale under a 30 day provision in deeds of trust to 
appear every day the paper was issued and if it didnot 
appear, to conclude that the matter had been settled 
and that there would be no sale, when they examined 
the World-News, and it did not appear is absolutely 
established by this record; for an examination of the 
newspaper files of one thousand or more advertisements 
by Trustees showed that when. ever a deed of trust 
provided for a 30 days advertisement in each and 
every instance the trustee had it appear in each issue 
of one newspaper that was issued within the 30 days. 
There were only two exceptions and only one sale made 
and that by a man from Lynchburg who was trustee. 
This fact is no where contradicted. In this list of 
trustees were J os. I. Doran, General Attorney for the 
N. & W. Railway Company, William A. Glasgow, 
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Robt. E. Scott, L. H. Cocke, A. P. Staples, H. T. Hall, 
and all the leading lawyers at the Roanoke Bar as well 
as business men who were trustees. R. Vol. I, p. 492 
to 510. 
McNulty, in every other case than this one, 
advertised in one paper only, and for the full 30 days. 
R. Vol. I. p. 492-93 and 545-46. 
The universal custom and understanding being 
that where the deed of trust provided for 30 days 
advertisement, it had to appear in each issue of the 
paper selected for 30 days and if the paper selected 
was a daily paper in each issue of that paper that 
appeared within 30 days. Its force and effect must 
be and is controlling and in this case must be con-
sidered and cannot be passed over, and McNulty's 
insertion of notice in the World-News, a daily paper, 
weekly is not only of no force or effect as a compliance 
with the deed of trust, but was a damage and this 
court cannot say to what extent it was a damage. 
Wolf v. Ward, Supra. Dillard v. Krise, Supra. 
But whether a damage or not it was not a 
compliance with the provision of the deed of trust as 
McNulty and Wertz understood, and on the basis of 
which the contract was made, nor as the public uni-
versally construed said provision to mean and must 
in this case be controlling. Butler Brothers vs. 
Virginian R. R. Co., 113 Va. 28-35-36. 
At page 7 of the courts opinion we find this 
statement: 
"Wertz was present throughout the sale on July 
16th, and made no objection to anything which was 
there done.'' 
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In the case of Shear vs. Traders Bldg. Assoc., 
52 S. E. 861, it appears that the owner of the land was 
present and was silent, yet the court says, "such pres-
ence and silence in no manner estopped him; that the 
owner had no control of the sale; that the sale was 
being .conducted entirely by the trustees. Shears had 
no voice in it; that all that can be. charged to him is 
that he was present and was silent; that he did not then 
say that the trustees had no power to make the sale as 
they were proceeding to do. A purchaser of property 
sold by a trustee under a deed of trust given to secure 
a debt, and authorizing the trustee, after advertising 
in a certain manner, to make sale of the property to 
satisfy the debt secured thereby, is charged with notice 
of the powers of the trustee; and it is the purchaser's 
duty to inquire and determine for himself if the sale 
is being made in conformity with the provisions of the _ 
instrument creating the trust.'' 
To our minds, .since Wertz thought so much 
of his land, of its value and had exerted every effort to 
stave off the sale, his silence is beyond doubt conclusive 
of the fact that he knew of no defects in the advertise-
ment, and believed himself bound by the coQ.tract of 
July· 3rd, into which he had entered upon the belief 
both by him, arid his attorney, that the trustee had 
"done all the law required of him." Or else he would 
not only have objected but would have enjoined the 
sale. 
It is true that the files of the paper in which the 
advertisement had appeared was in a stones throw of 
him, but since McNulty had told Wertz that he had 
complied, what shall we do with the settled law laid 
down in the following cases? 
From these cases, there can be no doubt that 
there was no duty resting upon Wertz or Fox to investi-
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gate the newspaper files of the Roanoke Times and 
World News. 
A full statement of the law was decided in the 
case of Brown vs. Rice and quoted with approval in 
Hull vs. Fields & Thomas, 76 Va. 607 where it is thus 
laid down: 
In Brown v. Rice's, Adm'r, 26 Gratt. 473, the 
judge who delivered the opinion of the court says, 
"Again, it is argued that the defendant should not have 
relied upon these representations. She ought to have 
made further inquiry-she had the same means of infor-
mation that the other party had. That she had the same 
means of information does not appear from the aver-
ments of the pleas. But if she might have had access 
to accurate information, it was not incumbent on her 
to make further inquiry. A man to whom a particular 
and distinct representation has been made, is entitled 
to rely on the representation, and need not make any 
further inquiry." "No man. can complain that another 
has relied too implicitly on the truth of what he himself 
stated"-citing Kerr on Fraud and Mistakes, pp. 80-l. 
The same principle in a recent English case has 
been positively affirmed by Lord Chelansford. He 
says, "When once it is established that there has been 
any fraudulent misrepresentation or willful concealment 
by which a person had been induced to enter into a 
contract, it is no answer to his claim to be relieved 
from it to tell that he might have known the truth by 
proper inquiry. He has a right to retort upon his 
objector, 'You at least, who have stated what is untrue, 
or have concealed the truth for the purpose of drawing 
me into a contract, cannot accuse me of want of caution, 
because I relied implicitly on your fairness and hon-
esty.' " Pollock's Principles of Contract, p. 488; see 
also Pomeroy on Contracts, §219. 
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The law there declared is later approved_ in 
the case of Lowe vs. Trundall, 78 Va: page 69, and in 
the last named case, the court says: 
"And in the absence of evidence to 
the contrary, we must presume that he 
did rely upon the representations." 
And still the later case of Wilson vs. Carptenter, 91 Va. 
page 190 the court said: 
"Nor is the buyer deprived of his 
right to relief because the had the means 
of discovering that the representation 
was false. 
Redgrave vs. Hurd, 20 Ch. Div. I, 
quoted in Benjamin J. Sales, page 499." 
In I Bigelow on Fraud, at page 523, the law is 
thus stated: 
"Indeed a representation may as well 
mislead even where the means of knowl-
edge are directly at hand as where they 
are not. * * * * * A man 
may act upon a positive representation of 
fact, nothwithstanding the fact that the 
means of knowledge were specially open 
to him, although he had legal notice, e. g. 
in the public registry, of the real state of 
things." 
McNULTY'S DESIRE TO PERSONALLY 
BENEFIT HIMSELF AT THE EXPENSE OF 
WERTZ IN THE ONE CASE AND CLAY IN 
THE OTHER WAS THE SOLE CAUSE OF 
THE EXECUTION OF THE CONTRACT 
OF JULY 3, 1920. 
The most important fact in this case and one 
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showing the error into which the court has fallen by 
reason in a large part, by not having the evidence 
pointed out to it by appellant, as is now attempted in 
this petition and which should have been pointed out 
in the brief, which shows beyond all question that the 
facts of this case come directly under the rule of law 
laid down in the foregoing quotation from the case in 
which Judge Holt wrote the opinion, adopted by the 
Court, of Swineford vs. Trustee, supra. It isimpossible 
for the Judge who wrote the opinion, and the Court 
who approved it in that case, to do otherwise than 
apply the rule there laid down as heretofore quoted 
in this case when the court finds the facts to be just 
the opposite to those found by this court. 
Why MeN ulty refused to postpone the sale for 
thirty days when requested so to do by Ball on or about 
the 20th of June, 1920, and why he refused Fox thirty 
days postponement on Sunday, July 4, 1930, and why, 
on that date, he agreed to postpone and continue the 
advertisement in the paper for ten days only (on two 
conditions) and would not continue it for _thirty days · 
on any condition, and in the answer to these inquiries 
will be found the real facts of this case. The evidence 
bearing on this issue conclusively shows beyond all 
peradventure of a doubt that but one thing prompted 
McNulty in refusing to postpone the sale and that was 
so that he could get "his commission" out of Wertz, 
if, by chance, Ball could get a loan and which Ball had 
told him he could get if he had thirty days, but could 
not get in ten days time, and told him why he could 
not get it in ten days, or out of Clay if Ball did not get 
the money in ten days by a sale of the property instead 
of postponing the sale in the interest of both Wertz and 
Clay, and allow Ball to get the loal}.,for, in that event, 
he would only get $20.00 instead of $2000.00. 
That the law will not allow a Trustee to so act 
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is so fully set out in the Swineford case that no other 
authorities need be cited, and that statement is. fully 
in accord with every decision of this court and with the 
ablest text writers that any further authorities are 
useless. · 
In order to get at the facts, it is necessary to 
point out the evidence prior to and at the time of the 
execution of that contract. 
The case brought before this court for deter-
mination on this appeal begins with the execution of 
the deed of truston May 22, 1917. Later the Wildwood 
Corporation bought the land from Wertz and assumed 
the loan of $40,000.00. 
At that time Wertz's father's home was still 
standing on the land. Soon thereafter, and before the 
first coupon fell due, the house which was insured for 
$1500.00, burned. The Insurance Co. paid the money 
. • • • to McNulty, Trustee. Both Wertz and the "Wilelw99S 
~~8F)38fttti9s directed the Trustee to apply that money 
to the interest coupon which fell due six months from 
May 22, 1917. McNulty refused to do this, and 
advertised the property for sale in the Roanoke Times. 
This fact appears from a decree that was later entered 
by consent, directing that the money be paid out as 
was set forth. 
''In paragraph 17 of the bill, which 
deals with the proper application of the 
sum of $1500.00 insurance money col-
lected by said Trustee; and as to this 
fund, the court doth AD JUDGE, OR-
DER and DECREE that this sum of 
$1500.00 insurance money in the hands of 
said Trustee, should be disbursed by 
said Trustee as follows: 
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He will first pay $242.54 to himself 
the moneys expended by him in paying off 
the taxes heretofore assessed against the 
land conveyed, and which were not paid 
by the said Wertz, or the Wildwood 
Corporation, and which were paid by said 
Trustee. He will then pay the overdue 
interest to the holders of the notes secured 
by said deed of. trust, and the residue he 
will apply, so far as the same will go, in 
paying for the advertisements of the sale 
of said property by said Trustee; and that 
no sale of said property shall be made by 
said Trustee unless the interest on the 
notes secured by said deed of trust 
becomes again overdue and unpaid." 
* * * "We consent to this decree." 
R. Vol. 2 page 1169-1170. 
Had not all of the parties secured in the deed of trust 
wished the money so applied, and had directed MeN ulty 
Trustee so to do, so far as they were concerned, they 
would not have signed a consent decree directing that 
the money be applied as Wertz had requested that 
it be done, clearly shows that no one but McNulty, 
Trustee, against the wishes of the beneficiaries and 
the grantor, caused that advertisement to be inserted 
at that time. 
As will be noted; the decree provides that the 
Trustee shall not advertise until another coupon fell 
due if the amount of that insurance money was not 
sufficient to pay. the coupon. The inhibition against 
his advertising clearly establishes the fact that he had 
advertised against their will in the first instance. 
Further, it is to be observed that in that part of said 
decree providing for the distribution of ·the money, 
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MeN ulty was not decreed to be paid one dollar for his 
services in putting the notice of sale in the paper, which 
is further conclusive evidence that he advertised in 
opposition to the will of all the beneficiaries secured 
in said deed of trust. 
After the en try of that decree, Wertz paid each 
coupon on the day that it fell due, without a single 
solitary exception, up to the time that the loan matured, 
which was on the 22nd day of May, 1920, and on the 
31st of May, 1920 McNulty advertised this property for 
sale. At no time after the loan matured and when, for 
the first time, he knew that he had to sell, did he see 
Wertz, and of course did not give Wertz an opportunity 
to name the terms to be advertised as to the residue, 
provided for in the deed of trust. · 
After the insertion of the advertisement in 
the newspaper, somewhere between the first and the 
15th of June, 1920, McNulty called Wertz's attention 
to his having advertised the property. 
Wertz at once employed Ball who went to Lynch-
burg and took up the matter with E. N. Newman, the 
broker of the banking house of Lazarus . & Co. of 
of Baltimore, who told Ball that his bank would not 
entertain the proposition because they did not have 
time enough-that it would take at least thirty days 
for the bank to send. its appraiser to ascertain its value, 
and if satisfied with the value·, it then had to have the 
title examined and the papers executed, and that could 
not be done in less than thirty days, but that if he could 
have the Trustee postpone the sale for thirty days, he 
would take it up and while he could not say that the 
bank would make the loan until the property was 
examined, he was of the opinion from what he had been 
told, that there was a good prospect of the loan being 
62 
made. The question here presented is not whether 
Wertz would secure the money or not. The fact is, 
McNulty did not want Wertz to get the money. 
That was anything else but what he wanted. He 
wanted to sell the property and nothing else, and 
therefore, declined it. Ball returned to Roanoke-at 
once saw McNulty, stated the facts to him, and upon 
those facts being stated to him, MeN ulty, without a 
moment's hesitation, without taking the matter up with 
either of the beneficiaries, replied-
"No, I will not postpone that sale 
one day, and if you want to stop it being 
sold on July 5th, I will have to have a 
certified check from their banker for the 
full amount due before 12 o'clock A. M., 
July 5, for I will not postpone it, and 
you can tell Wertz so and tell Mr. New-
man so." 
R. Vol. I page 535. 
The time McNulty refused Ball to continue the 
sale, was about the 20th of June, and at that time 
neither Mr. Paul M. Penick, Treasurer of W. & L., 
and Attorney for one of the parties holding $10,000 
of the first lien, secured under the deed of trust, nor 
Mr. H. G. Murray, who held the other $10,000 thus 
secured, wished the return of their money, but wanted 
it to continue at interest. R. Vol. 2 page 685. The 
fact that they did not want their money is further 
shown by the fact that McNulty as Attorney, entered 
into a contract with Mr. Clay to loan him the money 
which was later loaned, McNulty demanding from 
Clay a brokerage therefor. R. Vol. 2 page 945. At 
the time the refusal was made Clay was in Florida. 
It is true that before Clay left for Florida, which was 
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some six months prior thereto, he said to McNulty that 
when the Wertz loan matured that he wanted his 
money returned. It appears from Clay's letters to 
McNulty that McNulty had never said anything to him 
about Wertz's not paying the loan at maturity, or that 
he had advertised the same, or of Wertz's wishing him 
to postpone the sale for thirty days in order to give Clay 
his money. Clay was advised of the property being 
advertised by the Colonial Bank. R. Vol. 2 page 
942-945. From these facts it is clear that neither of 
the parties secured were asked by McNulty whether to 
grant Ball's request for time in which to obtain the 
loan and pay off the lien. 
The cost of postponing the sale was nil. It 
was no more for thirty days than ten days. The debt 
was bearing interest, and Clay did not have the money 
with which to pay off the first lien and had rather have 
had his money returned than to borrow money, and 
it was to Clay's benefit, as well as Wertz's to have it 
paid by Wertz. But it was not to McNulty's personal 
benefit, and there is the rub-for the loan to be paid 
off. McNulty could not charge over $20.00. McNulty 
wanted $2,000.00 commission and he could only get 
that by selling the land. That was- his sole intent and 
object, and it was immaterial to McNulty out of whom 
he got the $2,000.00 to which he was in no wise entitled 
-Wertz or Clay. His duty was, acting in the interest 
of all parties and throwing his own private interest 
out of the question, to . have granted the time and 
allowed Ball an opportunity to secure the money which 
he was satisfied he could get, but whether Ball could 
have secured it or not does not enter into the question 
we are here discussing. Later Ball employed Fox, 
and when they met to ask for postponement, on 
Sunday morning, July 4th, in McNulty's office, Fox 
asked for thirty days continuance and McNulty flatly 
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refused it. This appears at page 198 of Ball's evidence. 
R. Vol. 1: 
"Q. What did you say to Mr. Me-
N ulty, and what did he say to you, in 
regard to an extension for the postpone-
ment of the sale? 
A. I don't remember the exact 
conversation, but I asked him to give me 
an extension for thirty days. 
Q. What did he tell you? 
A. He refuse9 me flatly first. 
Q. Did he say anything else except 
flatly refusing you? 
A. He said he was going to sell the 
property, that he was tired of fooling with 
it. 
McNulty later did say that he would continue 
it for ten days if Wertz would agree to waive all errors 
and pay just the same amount of money, namely: 
$2,000.00 that he would get personally . as his com-
missions if he sold the property the next day-within 
only twenty-four hours time. This appears at page 
199 of record. Vol. 1. 
"Q. Just detail what happened in 
Mr. McNulty's office that Sunday morn-
ing? 
A. We discussed the matter and 
Mr. Fox asked him for thirty days exten-
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sion of the sale and Mr. McNulty refused 
it and finally he consented to give him ten 
days. I told him I did not think I could 
do any thing in ten days but that time 
was decided on. 
Q. So you decided on that that 
. morning? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. After that had been decided on, 
what else did you decide? 
A. McNulty said he would not give 
him even the ten days unless he would 
give him $2,000.00 commission. · 
Q. How was that evidenced? 
A. Evidenced in the contract." 
Why postpone for ten days and not for thirty 
days which Ball then stated was not sufficient time? 
There can be, we repeat, but one answer. If thirty 
days was granted, Wertz might get the money and 
then McNulty would lose his chance of getting his 
hands on $2,000.00. McNulty knew as well as Fox 
knew that no loan could be secured in ten days time 
from a banking house in Baltimore, and for that 
reason made the exaction that he did of 10 days that 
no matter which of the two, Wertz, who had made him 
Trustee, or Clay who had loaned the money, would 
have to pay him for his own personal benefit $2,000.00 
directly opposed to the interest of both, and directly 
contrary to every decision on this issue. McNulty 
forced this contract on Wertz and forced Clay to pay 
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$2,000.00 when if he had done his duty it might have 
been saved. Rossett vs. Fisher, 11 Gratt., (38 Va.) 
Va. page 408-500. This is what this record shows as to 
the fairness of McNulty's conduct. Such conduct 
does not in any wise comply with the high standard 
fixed by . Judge Holt, speaking for this court in the 
Swineford case,-No-ten thousand times no-. and 
no four men will say "no" quicker than the four who 
rendered the decision in this case when they see these 
facts that are now called to their attention, and 
which cannot be questioped in any wise, and the most 
of which evidence was produced by appellees, and 
which facts are shown bv the circumstances sur-
' rounding the transaction to-be true beyond the perad-
venture of even a doubt. 
Parr vs. Saunders, 11 S. E. Supra. Clay was 
not a party to this contract as found by the decision . 
of the court in this case, and did not know of its 
existence until 1926-therefore, has no right to object 
to this court doing the only thing that it can do which 
is to decree that contract to be illegal and therefore 
void or voidable at Wertz's election. 
For the fraud of the Trustee if this case is 
reversed, McNulty should be decreed to pay Clay the 
commissions that he unlawfully exacted from him. 
Nothing is better settled than that no man who 
is not a party to a con tract and did not know of its 
existence, can object to its. cancellation, whether 
that contract be illegal or only voidable. 
Had Clay bought the property relying on that 
contract as giving to the Trustee the right to sell, or if the 
Trustee had complied with the requirements both as to 
terms and to the advertisement, with neither of which 
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he· has complied, and on whom the burden rests to show 
full compliance (Gibson vs. Jones, supra; Waddey vs. 
Grimes, supra; Lowe vs. Trundall, supra) as this court 
will find when it comes to consider the real merits of 
this case, another issue might arise, but he did neither-
therefore "Clay cannot cross· on this bridge," but 
must be satisfied with all his money he had loaned 
Wertz and the interest thereon, together with all 
taxes, and all costs expended, and return to Wertz 
the legal title which he holds as Trustee first for his 
own benefit and then for Wertz's benefit. 
We therefore, respectfully petition the court, 
upon the grounds stated herein, to rehear the cause of . 
Wertz v. Clay & McNulty, decided on the 17th day 
of September, 1931, at the session of the Court, in 
Staunton, Virginia. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DILLARD, MOOMAW & DILLARD 
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